Welcome to the debut of my new series on the
Japanese economy - a topic in Japan second on the "weather", but
discussed with less enthusiasm and definitely less clarity.
Let me first say that despite the gloom and
doom held by most regarding that state of the Japanese economy, I am a
"big fan" of the Japanese economy. Structurally I think the
country is very stable and resilient. The country will probably
never create the success of the late 20th century, but neither will
America or the European Union. That said, I truly believe that
Japan is well
positioned to take care of the general welfare of it's citizens,
something that I think western country are going to stuggle with for at
least a decade. Anyway, there are numerous deeply engrained myths
about the Japanese economy, held by those domically and well as in
America. Over time I hope to dispel them and bring clarity and
insight to this important issue.
First let's start with per person GDP
adjusted for inflation, specifically nominal GDP per capital adjusted to
2008 real yea by Japan CPI. See technical not below. The
graph of the data is from 1952 tell a remarkable story. A few points worth
noting:
Discussion
The effects of WWII on Japan was devastating on both people and
the economy. In 1952 economic statistics became available
again but realize that we ar starting from a very low base. .
From 1952 to 1964 the year of the Tokyo Olympics, Real
economic activity person almost tripled (178% growth ).
Conceptually, best to think of this as a post war normalization
period.
1964 to 1973. From 1964 to the year of
the Arab Oil Embargo, real economic activity person almost double
(96% growth ). During these times, there were tremendous
undeveloped opportunities to exploit as as seen here graphically.
1973 to 1981 Rapid increases in oil prices
following the Arab Oil Embargo resulted in consumer prices
doubling. That said, nominal gdp tracked this general rise.
Overall, Real economic activity per person grew a total of 8% during
these difficult times, which also line with real growth in average
wages.
1981 to 1989. Pre-Bubble Growth. A 38%
growth in economic activity per person. 1981 was the year
oil prices began to "break". Also the year interest rates in
the USA began to decline from record high levels. over all the
80s was a period where people became much better off.
1990 to 2008. 1990 marked the beginning of a 13+ year real
estate and stock market decline. The economy charged onward
another 10% (in nominal terms) through by this was accompanied by
inflation so the economic growth was not real. There were
numerous high profile banking disaster, bailout, forced mergers in
the early 2000s. Stock market bottomed in March 2003 - the
same week I first came to Japan. As the financial markets
stabilized the general economic mode inprove. That said, sespite economic calamity of the 90s and
early 2000s, the real economic activity per person from 1990 to 2008
actual was 4% larger and real per capita wages up 8% total over a 18 year period.
Technical notes: Data set started with nominal gdp per
capita and converted it to "inflation adjusted 2008 yen". Hence,
them number a "real gdp" number. However, it is not the GDP using
the GDP deflator, a classic economist way of looking at real GDP.
Normally, the results are very similar if not the same. However,
for some reason, the GDP deflator numbers paint a slight brighter
picture of the post 1990 period. Since I am extremely
uncomfortable with this assessment, I deem it most appropriate to
convert my "inflation adjusted yen" approach as it really is the yen the
people spend every day and not some number arising from by economic
theory.
Bubble Fiction
Watching the
movie "Bubble Fiction" is great introduction to the Japanese
economy. It is a reasonably well know Japanese Comedy where a
Japanese youth follows her scientist "single mom" back in time (with
a time machine) to try to prevent the bursting of the real estate
bubble. She ends up "falling for a man" who would eventually
be her father. I consider the viewing go this movie as a
prerequisite in understanding Japanese culture and mainstream
thinking regarding the economy.
Anyway, there are many misconceptions about the 1990 bubble.
Yes, a dramatic decrease in real estate that persist to this
day
Yes, a dramatic decrease in stock prices that continued for
13 years.
Yes, a banking system in distress even through 2003,
And, yes, the many anecdotal stories of both the excesses
and the horrible hardships post bubble.
However, a long term view of headline GDP data resulting is a
different perception.
Despite a) how terrible things were for many individuals and despite b)
how horrible the perceived lack of opportunity has been for many young
people, and despite c) US President Obama's comparison of the USA
economy to "Japan's Lost Decade", one certainly would not be able to
tell by looking at the chart to the right. The chart is
different the chart first discussed in that it focuses on "headline GDP
numbers" The chart shows:
Show total size and per person size
GDP data uses the GDP deflator not the CPI.
Chart shows real per capita GDP growth - which actually grew 20.4%
from 1990 to 2008, The chart is to the right and the
Real per Capital GDP growth by decade is as follows:
1950s 68.0 % (from 1952)
1960s 109.2 %
1970s 39.6 %
1980s 41.8 %
1990s 9.4 %
2000s: 10.0 % ( through 2008 )
We have talked about it earlier, Japan "posted " impressive GDP
growth numbers playing catchup following the end of WWII. Then the 70s and 80s was
impressive as Japanese electronic and automotive industries exploded on
the world scene.
It is true that the level of economic activity has slowed.
However, it is incorrect to say that Japan is stuck in / with a no
growth economy, which is often what people
assume when they listen too much to the media.
While Japan's 20.4% increase in real per capita GDP from 1990 to 2008,
is not as much as America's 36.1% growth or the growth of the UK or the
European Union, Japan's growth is impressive
in the following way:
Japan's economic expansion was balanced in that domestic
consumption hardly ever exceeded foreign export. Japan
generate significant capital account surpluses during this period.
Not unlike China recently but definitely different the the USA and
the E.U.
Japan growth (unlike America's) was fueled by a unprecedented
credit expansion and an, the level of overall indebtedness in the
banking system.
Japan's growth not occur as a result of an over-fascination with
a) consumption b) home building or c) retail. The composition
of economic activity did not necessarily dramatically increase.
Japan still had low inflation and low unemployment.
Interim Conclusion.
OK I think I have said enough detail. Let me finish this
brief introduction by
saying the following:
A stream that is "good for the fish" isn't necessarily good for
fishing. Japan is a place where I jokingly say "even McDonalds
and Walmart loses money" (true story for most of the early 2000s).
Return of Equity for Japanese companies is at least 1/2 that of US
and Western Europe. Host of reasons why, but key is that Japan
is in a low/no inflationary environment which makes the comparison
unfair.
Opportunities for young people remain challenged.
Furthermore, young people seem much less interests in working the
demanding # of hours required to be a Japanese "salary man"
Banking. Balance sheets are now much cleaner, but the
banking dominated by the Big 3. While c3 concentrations are
not what anti-trust types would call anticompetitive, these banks
are far beyond the can't fail level. Problematic for policy
makers.
Current Account Balances. The envy of all the world,
except China. (Story
for another time)
Consumerism & "Consumptionism" Japanese people are
fascinated with western brands. However, to Japan's credit,
policy makers and bankers have not used consumerism, or what I call consumptionism, to "prop up the economy".
Consulting CFO & Advisory Services.
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Background.
Mr. Barker's background includes CFO and acting president of a
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Formal education includes MBA from University of California, an MS
in Engineering from the University of Alaska, and a BS in Mechanical
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Lessons
Stocks & Real Estate - wildly overvalued in the late 80s,
makes a lot f sense it could not be sustained. The lesson
here is for policy makers..... (omitted ... discussed elsewhere)
There are also lessons for investors - both portfolio and
direct investment .... (omitted ... discussed elsewhere)